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IKf THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ROY S. LUDLOW INVESTMENT
COMPANY,
BRIEF OF APPELLEES
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
THOMAS W. OSTLER, NEIL W.
OSTLER, LEE H. OSTLER,
PAUL F. OSTLER, JOHN A.
VANDERMYDE, DELBERT CHRISTENSEN,
individually and all doing
business as
DESIGN LABEL MANUFACTURING,

Case No. 920174 CA

Defendants and Appellees.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to decide
this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j) (1953,
as

amended)

and

Rule

42 of

the Utah

Rules of Appellate

Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Whether the trial court was correct in admitting

parole evidence to determine the intention of the parties to a
written

lease

agreement.

The

standard

of

review

is for

correctness of law with no particular deference given to the
trial court's

conclusion.

However, once the trial court

concludes that the document is ambiguous and proceeds to find
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facts respecting the parties1 intentionf then the standard of
review is strictly limited.

The trial court's judgment will

then not be disturbed if, after reviewing the evidence in a
light most supportive of the court's findings, the evidence is
based on substantial, competent, admissible evidence.

Lyngle

v. Lyngle, 184 Utah Adv. Rep. 65 (Utah App. 1992)
2.

Whether the trial court's finding that the lease

provided that the tenants and landlord would jointly review
the contract at the end of each year for possible renewal is
clearly

erroneous

challenge

the

and

trial

should
court's

be set aside.

To properly

findings, the Appellant must

marshall all of the evidence in support of the trial court's
findings and then demonstrate that even reviewing it in the
light most favorable to the court below, the evidence is
insufficient
supra.

to support the findings.

Lyngle v. Lyngle,

Scharf v. BMG Corp, 700 P.2d 1060 (Utah 1985)
3.

Whether the trial court was correct in awarding

attorney's fees to the Defendants.
STATUTES AND RULES DETERMINATIVE OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
Utah

Code

Ann.

§78-27-56.5

Attorney's

fees

Reciprocal rights to recover attorney's fees.
A court may award

costs and attorney's

fees to

either party that prevails in a civil action based upon any
promissory note, written contract, or other writing executed
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after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of the promissory
note, written contract, or other writing allow at least one
party to recover attorney's fees.
Rule 4-505 of the Rules of Judicial Administration Attorney's fees affidavits,
(1)

Affidavits in support of an award of attorney's

fees must be filed with the court and set forth specifically
the

legal

performed

basis
by

the

for

the

award,

the

nature

attorney, the number of

of

the work

hours

spent to

prosecute the claim to judgment, or the time spent in pursuing
the matter to the stage for which attorney's fees are claim,
and affirm the reasonableness of the fees for comparable legal
services.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
a.

Nature of case and course of proceedings.

The trial of the matter was held on November 14,
1991,

and

judgment

was

rendered

on

behalf

of

Defendants

against the Plaintiff, no cause of action by the Court sitting
without a jury.

The Defendants cumulatively were granted

judgment for attorney's fees in the total amount of $2,500.00
to be divided amongst the seven Defendants equally.
Prior to the trial, the court denied Plaintiff's
Motion in Limine to exclude parole evidence which Defendants
proposed to offer in order to explain the terms of a lease
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agreement which was the subject matter of the action commenced
by Plaintiff.
Plaintiff has appealed the judgment of the trial
court stating that the trial court improperly allowed parole
evidence to be admitted to interpret the terms of the lease
agreement and that it erred in awarding attorney's fees to the
Defendants.
b.

Statement of Facts

On or about April 1, 1987, the Defendants as tenants
entered into a certain lease agreement with McMullin & Company
as landlord.

The landlord's interest in the lease agreement

was subsequently assigned to Roy S. Ludlow Investment Company,
the

Plaintiff

(Ludlow).

and

Appellant

(R. at 194)

in

the above-entitled

action

The lease agreement was prepared by

the original landlord, McMullin & Company, who was solely
responsible
therein.

for

the

language

of

the provisions

contained

(R. at 284)
Paragraph 2 of the lease agreement set forth the

term of the lease as being for the period of three (3) years
commencing

April 19, 1987 and continuing

to May 1, 1990.

Notwithstanding this provision setting forth the term, the
following sentence was added to the agreement at the bottom of
page 6 and in the middle of paragraph 9 of the lease agreement:
At the end of each year, the tenant
and landlord will jointly review the
contract for renewal.
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At the end of the first year, after the lease had
been assigned to Ludlow, the Defendants met with Mr. Ludlow to
discuss keeping the lease at the current rent and to point out
the option available to them pursuant to the sentence that had
been inserted at the bottom of page 6 of the lease agreement.
(R. at 195)

Mr. Ludlow refused to negotiate any of the provi-

sions of the lease.
original

(R. at 205)

negotiations,

Mr.

Ludlow

inserted sentence referred to.

Not being a party to the
had

no

(R. at 275)

idea

what

the

Some time there-

after, Mr. Ludlow received notification that the Defendants
were vacating the premises.

(R. at 205)

Some months later,

on or about June 8, 1989, after finding a new tenant for the
premises, Ludlow brought this action for damages on its lease
agreement with Def€mdants.
Richard
Ludlow.

Bruce

McMullin

testified

on

behalf

of

Mr. McMullin was the chief operating officer and

president of McMullin & Company, the original landlord, and
was the party who was responsible for negotiating and drafting
the lease agreement with the Defendants. (R. at 189, 284)
Mr. McMullin testified that he believed the term intended for
the lease was for three (3) years with no option to renew
after each of the years.

(R. at 191, 278)

When asked by
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counsel why the typewritten insertion was made to the lease
agreement, Mr. McMullin replied as follows:
The way it's worded here is really a
mystery to me. If I wrote this, I'm
embarrassed to have written it in such
a way because it is ambiguous and I
don't recall exactly what it pertained
to. To me, to the best of my interpretation of what I was probably getting at
in writing this, if in fact I did write
it, and I would assume that I did because
it appears here. However, I wish it was
initialed by both parties. I would assume
that it was a review of the common areas
and the charges associated with the cam
charges. (R. at 181)
When asked by the Court as to why such insertion was placed in
this lease when not included in other leases prepared by him,
the following dialogue was had:
MR. McMULLIN: I don't know. Maybe we
ought to ask them why I put it in. I
don't have any idea.
THE COURT: You have no recollection why?
MR. McMULLIN: I really don't, your Honor.
I don't recall the purpose of it. To me
it doesn't make a lot of sense the way it's
presented here. I'm embarrassed that it's
even in here. (R. at 182)
Then after making an indication that such insertion referred
to common area maintenance costs, Mr. McMullin was asked by
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counsel if he had any recollection as to why such insertion
was placed in paragraph 9 of the lease agreement rather than
paragraph 5, which paragraph pertained to common areas.

Mr.

McMullin replied as follows:
I don't. The way it's placed really
doesn't make any sense to me. And
normally I would initial such an adjustment.
And I don't—maybe the Ostlers and Dale
Christensen would have a better recall.
I really don't recall what the intent of
that particular sentence was, placed where
it was, without reference to another part
of the contract. It's confusing to me.
(R. at 186)
After the defense rested, Mr. McMullin was recalled
by Ludlow as a rebuttal witness.

After having heard the

Defendants testify, Mr. McMullin testified that he was able to
remember more of the transaction and as a result changed his
understanding for the inserted sentence.

(R. at 285)

Mr.

McMullin stated that instead of referring to CAM charges, the
inserted sentence was added to meet the Defendants' concerns
over the possibility of their business failing.

Mr. McMullin

testified that the sentence was inserted at the bottom of page
6 to give the Defendants comfort that the lease would be
renegotiated if their business failed.

(R. at 283)
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Mr.

Delbert

Lawrence

Christensen,

one

of

the

Defendants and a signatory upon the lease agreement, when
asked by counsel, stated that the lease agreement was not
signed by him or the other Defendants when first presented to
them.

(R. at 209)

The Defendants felt that they needed

something additional in the lease agreement to protect them
because they were a brand new company.

(R. at 211)

Mr.

Christensen stated to Mr. McMullin at the time that they were
looking for a termination clause after the first year if they
had to get out of the lease.

(R. at 211)

Mr. McMullin then

added the sentence at the bottom of page 6 and returned the
agreement to Mr. Christensen and the other signatories for
execution.

(R. at 211-213)

While the Defendants expected a

three year term, it was with the understanding that if the
company could not make a go of it, they would be able to
renegotiate or leave.
Mr.

Thomas

(R. at 229)
Ostler,

one

of

the

Defendants

and

signatories on the lease agreement, confirmed the testimony of
Mr. Christensen pertaining to the purpose for the sentence
inserted at the bottom of page 6.

(R. at 251-255)

Mr. Neil

Ostler, another Defendant and signatory of the lease agreement, confirmed Mr. Christensen's testimony as well.
263-265)

(R. at

It was the Defendants1 testmony that the subject

sentence referred to the term of the lease and allowed the
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lease to be subject to renewal after each year.

But for the

provision for renewal being added, the Defendants would not
have signed the lease agreement.
After previously denying Ludlow's Motion in Limine
and ruling that the sentence inserted at the bottom of page
6 of the lease agreement when viewed in light of paragraph 2
of the lease agreement made those provisions ambiguous, the
trial

court

determine

listened

their

to the testimony

intent.

At

the

of

the parties to

conclusion

of

both

the

Plaintiff's and Defendants cases, the trial court felt that
the

only

Defendants

evidence

before

themselves

provision was.

as

it

was

the

to what the

(R. at 308)

testimony
intent of

of

the

the term

The trial court found that the

testimony of Mr. McMullin was vague, inasmuch as he had stated
that he had no recollection of the discussions or negotiations
concerning the lease agreement.

(R. at 309)

The trial court

further found that the inserted sentence made no sense in
connection with paragraph 9 or paragraph 5.

The trial court

further found that the language added at the bottom of page 6
clearly referred to the parties renewing the contract at the
end of each year.

It therefore accepted

the Defendants'

testimony and found that the Defendants were excused from
further performance under the lease agreement.

(R. at 310)

As to the payment of attorney's f€>es, the trial
court refused to award any fees under the lease agreement
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based on the language of the attorney's fees provision that
limited fees to actions brought during the lease term.
at 310)

(R.

The trial court did, however, award attorney's fees

to the Defendants under the provisions of Utah Code Ann.
§78-27-56.5 (1953, as amended) which provides for a reciprocal
right of a party to recover attorney's fees if one party to
the contract is allowed attorney's fees under the provisions
of such contract.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Because the trial court determined that the contract
was ambiguous

and proceeded

to find

facts respecting

the

intention of the parties based on extrinsic evidence, the
Appellate Court's review is strictly limited.

The evidence

and all inferences that may be drawn therefrom are viewed in a
light most supportive of the findings of the trier of fact and
will not be disturbed if the judgment is based on substantial,
competent, admissible evidence.

To mount a successful attack

on the trial court's findings of fact, an appellant must
marshal all of the evidence in support of the trial court's
findings and then demonstrate that even viewing it in the
light most favorable to the court below, the evidence is
insufficent to support the findings.
this.

Ludlow has failed to do

Instead of marshaling all of the evidence in support

of the trial court's findings, Ludlow has simply emphasized
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the portions of testimony that support its conclusions.

The

trial court's findings are therefore not properly challenged.
ARGUMENT
I
BECAUSE THE LEASE AGREEMENT IS AMBIGUOUS, THE TRIAL
COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED PAROLE EVIDENCE TO EXPLAIN THE
PARTIES' INTENTION.
Ludlow

argues

that

the

trial

court

improperly

admitted parole evidence in varying the terms of the lease
agreement entered
Defendants.

into between McMullin & Company and the

The Utah Supreme Court in Union Bank v. Swenson,

707 P.2d 663 (Utah 1985), stated the parole evidence rule as
it applies to contract interpretation as follows:
The parole evidence rule as a principle
of contract interpretation has a very
narrow application. Simply stated/ the
rule operates in the absence of fraud to
exclude contemporaneous conversations,
statements, or representations offered
for the purpose of varying or adding to
the terms of an integrated contract.
In footnote 1, the trial court further explained the rule as
follows:
Note that although parole evidence is
inadmissible to vary or contradict the
clear and unambiguous terms of an
integrated contract, parole evidence is
admissible to clarify facial ambiguity,
(emphasis added)
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The

initial

inquiry,

therefore,

document on its face is ambiguous.

is

whether

the

Prior to trial, Ludlow

brought a Motion in Limine, wherein Ludlow requested the trial
court to rule that the parole evidence rule excluded extrinsic
evidence to interpret the lease agreement. After reviewing the
Memoranda of the parties, the trial court in its minute entry
noted that the lease agreement contained a provision in page 1
establishing the length of term for the lease to be three (3)
consecutive full years. Then on page 6 of the lease agreement,
under

the

paragraph

entitled

parties typed in the sentence:
tenant and
renewal."

landlord will

"Continuous

Operation",

the

"At the end of each year, the

jointly

review the contract for

That sentence did not appear to the trial court to

apply exclusively to paragraph 9 of the lease.

If it did

appear exclusively to paragraph 9, it was not clear on its
face how it did so.

It appeared to the trial court that the

sentence applied to the entire lease agreement.

However, if

applied to the entire lease agreement, it was inconsistent
with page 1 of the lease which set the term of the lease at
three (3) years.

Therefore, the trial court ruled that the

subject sentence is indeed ambiguous and that it would be
helpful to the trier of fact to receive parole evidence to
explain that particular provision of the lease.
denied Ludlow's Motion in Limine.
attached as an Addendum)

It therefore

(See copy of Minute Entry
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The ambiguity of the provision was borne out in the
testimony that was offered by Ludlow.
Ludlow testified on behalf of Ludlow.

Mr. McMullin and Mr.
While Mr. McMullin

testified that it was his belief that the term of the lease
was for three (3) years unless the Defendants went bankrupt,
he testified that the language of the sentence was confusing
to him.

He had first testified that the language must have

applied to CAM charges, which are the subject of paragraph 5
of

the

lease

testimony,

he

agreement.

After

changed

testimony

his

hearing
and

the

Defendants'

stated

that

he

recalled the conversations over concern of business failure
and

felt

that

the

sentence

referred

to

a

provision

to

renegotiate the lease in the event of the failure of the
Defendants' business.

Mr. Ludlow, not being a party to the

original negotiations, did not know what was intended by the
inserted sentence.

He admitted that the language of the

sentence was ambiguous and confusing.
Based on all of this, the trial court was correct in
determining that the inserted sentence when read with paragraph 2 is ambiguous and unclear as to the parties' intent.
It therefore was correct when it admitted parole evidence to
clarify the parties' intention.
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II
LDDLOW FAILED TO MARSHAL ALL OF THE EVIDENCE IN
SUPPORT OF THE TRIAL COURTS FINDINGS AND THEN
DEMONSTRATE THAT EVEN VIEWING IT IN THE LIGHT
MOST FAVORABLE TO THE COURT BELOW, THE EVIDENCE
IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE FINDINGS.
In Lyngle v. Lyngle, 184 Utah Adv. Rep. 65 (Utah App.
1992), the Utah Court of Appeals explained the court's review
of the trial court's findings on the ambiguity of documents.
The court stated the following:
Whether a document is ambiguous is a
question of law (citation omitted),
which we review for "correctness"
(citation omitted), according "no
particular deference" to the trial
court's conclusion. (citation omitted)
Howeverf once the trial court determines
a document is ambiguous and "proceeds to
find facts respecting the intentions of
the parties based on extrinsic evidence,
then our review is strictly limited."
(citations omitted)
We then "review
the evidence and all inferences that
may be drawn therefrom in a light most
supportive of the findings of the trier
of fact" and will not disturb the
trial court's judgment if it is "based
on substantial, competent, admissible
evidence." (citations omitted) A
document is ambiguous "if it is subject
to two plausable constructions" (citation
omitted) or its terms are so incomplete
they create confusion as to its meaning.
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In the present case, as argued above, the inserted
sentence led to confusion as to what the term of the lease was
to be for.

Consequently, the trial court admitted extrinsic

evidence to clarify the parties' intention.

Ludlow argues

that both Mr. Christensen and Mr. McMullin testified that the
lease term was for three (3) years and that the only reason
that the Defendants requested to get out of the term was
because they wanted to lower their rent.

While Ludlow takes

portions of witness's testimony that would appear to support
his conclusions, he fails to marshal together all evidence in
support of the trial court's findings and then demonstrate that
that evidence is insufficient to support the findings. In this
case, Ludlow has omitted the fact that Mr. McMullin testified
that he had no recollection as to the negotiations. He further
omits the fact that Mr. McMullin, after hearing the testimony
of the Defendants, recalled that there was conversation in
regards to concerns over the abilities of the* new business.
While Mr. McMullin originally stated that he felt that the
inserted sentence did not apply to the term, but applied to
the CAM charges only, his later testimony concluded that he
felt that the term was meant to be subject to the parties
renegotiation in the event of the Defendants' bankruptcy or
business failure.

Ludlow also fails to show the testimony of

Mr. Christensen as stating that while they intended to enter
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into a three (3) year lease, it was their understanding that
there needed to be a provision that allowed them to leave
after one year in the event that the business did not succeed.
Ludlow also omits testimony from Mr. Christensen that the lease
agreement as first presented was unacceptable and that the
Defendants needed a way out in the event that their business
did not succeed.

As a result of that concern, Mr. McMullin

then inserted the typewritten sentence and returned the document to the Defendants who, understanding that their concerns
were met, executed the lease.
other

signers

of

the

Ludlow omits the testimony of

lease agreement

that

supported

and

confirmed Mr. Christensen1s testimony as to the intention of
the parties.
Not

having

marshaled

together

that

evidence

supporting the trial court's findings, Ludlow has failed to
properly challenge the trial court's findings.
must therefore be dismissed.

The appeal

The trial court discounted the

testimony of Mr. McMullin because of his inability to recall
the events.

The trial court further rejected the interpreta-

tions of Ludlow as being inconsistent with the words of the
sentence itself.

The words of the sentence more closely

supported the interpretation testified to by the Defendants.
As a result, the findings of the trial court are not clearly
erroneous and must be affirmed.

-17-

III
THE APPELLEES ARE ENTITLED TO THEIR ATTORNEYS PEES
PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN. §78-27-56.5 (1953, as amended)
Ludlow
awarded

argues

attorney's

fees

that

the

because

trial

court

attorney's

improperly

fees were not

properly plead/ because attorney's fees can only be awarded to
enforce the provisions of the contract and therefore are not
available

if the contract

is terminated, and because the

documents furnished by some of the Appellees do not comply
with Rule 4-506 [sic] of the Code of Judicial Administration.
Attorney's fees are available pursuant to paragraph
32 of the lease agreement.
$2,500.00.

That provision limits such fees to

Furthermore, it appears to limit the availability

of attorney's fees to an action that is brought during the
term of the lease. While attorney's fees may not be available
to the Defendants under the lease provision since the action
was brought after the lease terminated, such fees would have
been available to- Ludlow had it prevailed on its assertions
that the lease did not terminate until 1990.

Being available

to Ludlow, such fees are similarly available to the Defendants
pursuant to Utah's Attorney's Fees Reciprocity Act, Utah Code
Ann. §78-27-56.5 (1953, as amended).
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In their answer, the Defendants requested that the
trial court dismiss the Plaintifffs Complaint and that they
be awarded

their attorney's

fees incurred

in the matter.

Contrary to Ludlow's assertions, the Rules of Civil Procedure
do

not

require

that

attorney's

fees be plead

by way of

counterclaim.
In L&V Leasing, Inc. v. Collin, 805 P.2d 189 (Utah
App. 1991), the Utah Court of Appeals held that where a party
seeking attorney's fees failed to specify the hourly rate,
there was not a failure to comply with Rule 4-505 so long as
the legal basis of the award, the nature of the work performed
by the attorneys, the number of hours spent to prosecute the
claim and some affirmation the fees charged are reasonable in
light of the comparable legal services are included in the
affidavit submitted by the party requesting the fees.
In the case at bar, the Affidavit furnished by the
Appellees

Thomas

W.

Ostler, Neil

W.

Ostler

and

John A.

Vandermyde, set forth the fact that the billable rate for said
Appellees' attorney was $95.00 an hour and that said rate was
standard for the firm and in the community.

It further stated
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that through the trial of the above-entitled matter, affiant
expended 33.5 hours at $95.00 an hour, for a total attorney's
fee in the amount of $3,182.50. Attached to the Affidavit was
a breakdown of the total billings for each month.
Ludlow cross-examined Attorney Anderson.

Counsel for

During that cross-

examination. Attorney Anderson described the work that was
required for the hours expended.

Ludlow's counsel objected

to not having a day-by-day breakdown of the hours expended.
Having set forth the basis for the award, having explained on
cross-examination the nature of the work performed, having set
forth the number of hours spent to defend the claim, having
affirmed the reasonableness of the fees charged, and having
set forth the hourly rate billed to the Defendants, Rule
4-505 has been complied with.

The Defendants are entitled to

the attorney's fees awarded.
IV
THE DEFENDANTS ARE FURTHER ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS
FEES ON APPEAL DDE TO THE FRIVOLOUS NATURE OF THE APPEAL.
Pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, if the Court determines that an appeal taken under
these Rules is frivolous or for delay, it shall award just
damages, which may include single or double costs, as defined
in

Rule

34,

and/or

prevailing party.

reasonable

attorney's

fees,

to

the

The Rule further defines a frivolous appeal
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as one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing
law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify,
or reverse existing law.
In the case at bar, it is clear from the document as
well as the evidence taken at trial by Ludlow's own witnesses,
that the provisions in question were ambiguous.

Therefore, it

is clear that being ambiguous, the law allows for the court to
admit extrinsinc evidence in determining the intent of the
parties.

In allowing that extrinsic evidence, it is also

clear that the weight of the evidence supported the trial
court's findings and that an appeal would not change that
conclusion.

Ludlow is feeling secure in its position that

attorney's fees will be capped at $2,500.00 regardless of the
fees that it requires the other parties to incur as a result
of its appeal.

The appeal is not well-founded in the law nor

on

as

the

facts

they

were

presented

by

Ludlow

itself.

Therefore, the court should find the appeal frivolous and
should award the Defendants their additional attorney's fees
incurred in defending the action on appeal.
CONCLUSION
The

trial

court's

decision

dismissing

Ludlow's

Complaint against the Defendants and awarding attorney's fees
in favor of the Defendants must be affirmed.

In addition,
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the

court

should

award

the

Defendants

their

additional

attorney's fees incurred in defense of Ludlow's appeal.
Respectfully submitted this 17th day of July, 1992.

JoKm Burton Anderson
Attorney for Defendants Thomas W.
Ostler, Neil W. Ostler and
John A. Vandermyde
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROY S. LUDLOW INVESTMENT CO.,

:

MINUTE ENTRY

:

Case No. 890903593 CV

vs.

:

JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL

THOMAS W. OSTLER, et al.,

:

Defendants.

:

Plaintiff,

Now before the Court is plaintiff's Motion in Limine.
The Court has reviewed the memos filed in support of and in
opposition thereto, has reviewed the Lease itself and now rules
as follows:
Plaintiff seeks to exclude parole evidence in the nature
of an interpretation of the Lease Agreement.

Page 1 of the

Lease establishes the length of term for the Lease to be three
(3) consecutive full years.

In Page 6 of the Lease under the

paragraph entitled "Continuous Operation" the parties have typed
in the sentence "At the end of each year the tenant and landlord
will jointly review the contract for renewal."

That sentence

does not appear to apply exclusively to paragraph 9 (Continous

g \ # ¥ # * *•* ^ ^ *-*

Operation)

of

the

Lease.

If

it

does

appear

exclusively

Paragraph 9 it is not clear on it's face how it does so.

to
The

subject sentence would appear to apply more appropriately to the
entire Lease Agreement.
inconsistency

between

However if that is the case there is an
that

statement

and

Paragraph

2

of

the

is

of

the

Lease which sets the length of term at three (3) years.
Under

all

of

these

circumstances

the

Court

opinion that the subject sentence is indeed ambiguous as used in
the context of this Lease and rules that it would be helpful to
the trier
particular

of fact to receive parole evidence to explain
provision

of

the

Lease, and

accordingly

will

this
deny

plaintiff's Motion in Limine.
Counsel for defendants is to prepare an order consistent
with this ruling.
DATED this

i^
(0

day of November, 1991.

FRANK G. NOEL
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

^

000099

